Wilfred Burton Croft was born in Spanish Ship Bay, Guysborough County, on November 18, 1920, the second-youngest of George Henry and Lydia Olive (Jack) Croft’s 12 children. George Henry was a native of Sherbrooke, the son of George Henry and Harriet (Jack MacDonald) Croft, Gegogan, while Lydia was the daughter of Jacob and Mary (Rudolph) Jack, Liscomb. The couple were married at Gegogan on September 20, 1901.
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| Trooper Wilfred Burton Croft |
At the time of the 1911 Canadian census, 35-year-old George Henry and 25-year-old Lydia were living in Lower Liscomb with their three oldest children—Mary Adelaide, age 10; Laura Olive, age eight; and Ruby Pearl, age two. Also living in the home were George’s father George Henry Croft Sr., age 80, and his wife Eliza, age 79. Over the next decade, Burton, the couple’s only son, and another five daughters—Rosella Beatrice, Lydia Mae, Hilda Angeline, Daisy Gertrude, and Ada Jane—joined the family. The family’s youngest child, Clara Margaret, was born in 1923.
Three of George and Lydia’s children died in childhood or infancy. Their oldest daughter Mary Adelaide passed away on February 16, 1916, the result of meningitis. Two other daughters—Elsie and Susie—do not appear in census or death records. However, their names are listed in Burton’s service file as deceased siblings.
Burton left school at age 13, having attended for seven years. His service file contains no information on his early employment. Burton may have fished with his father George, or worked in a local saw mill or lumber operation. Immediately prior to his enlistment, he was employed as a “cashier” at a “moving pictures” business operated by his sister and brother-in-law, Mae and Doug Nauffts, Isaac’s Harbour. The couple travelled by truck with their projector equipment to various locations along the Eastern Shote, setting up in community halls. Burton collected admission at the door and passed out tickets. Doug and Mae later established a theatre business in Canso.
On July 24, 1940, Burton enlisted with the Halifax Rifles at Halifax, NS, and commenced military service with the rank of ”Rifleman.” As the unit was part of the Canadian Active Service Force (CASF), its members were eligible for overseas service. Burton completed infantry training with the Rifles and served in the Halifax area for the next three years.
During that time, the Halifax Rifles underwent a major transition. On January 26, 1942, the Canadian government authorized the formation of the 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade. The unit consisted of the 20th Army Tank Battalion (Saskatchewan Horse), 24th Army Tank Battalion (Les Voltigeurs de Quebec), and 26th Army Tank Battalion (Grey & Simcoe Foresters, Ontario), and 23rd Army Tank Battalion (Halifax Rifles). The change meant that its “other rank” (OR) members were now referred to as “Troopers.”
Over the following 18 months, Halifax Rifles personnel made the transition from an infantry regiment to an armoured unit. On June 29, 1942, Burton reported to the Canadian Army Trade School, Hamilton, ON, for a driver mechanic’s course. While there, he spent two weeks in hospital with the mumps. Upon completing the initial course, Burton moved on to the Mechanics Training Centre, London, ON, on August 10. Two weeks later, he was certified as a “Ram II Tank Dr. [Driver] Mechanic Grade B” and rejoined the 23rd Army Tank Battalion (23rd ATB) for training at Camp Borden, ON.
In the autumn of 1942, the 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade commenced training at the recently completed Meaford AFV (Armoured Fighting Vehicle) range on Georgian Bay, where the Halifax Rifles completed the first exercise. Before year’s end, Burton qualified as a Loader Operator Group C, Grade II, and Driver Class III (Tank). On January 1, 1943, he was authorized to wear a Mars Badge, a patch bearing the zodiac sign of the Roman god of war and indicating that he had completed training.
On May 7, 1943, Burton qualified as a Driver IC [internal combustion] Class III (W). One month later, he received the standard five-day pre-embarkation leave. On June 17, he departed Canada with 23rd ATB and arrived in the United Kingdom one week later.
Following its overseas arrival, 23rd ATB underwent significant reorganization. An overhaul of armoured regiments meant that there was room for only one army tank brigade. After intense inspections of the 2nd and 3rd Army Tank Brigades, military authorities selected the 3rd for service in Western Europe. Re-designated the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, it went on to join the D-Day invasion force.
The 2nd Army Tank Brigade’s units became a reinforcement pool for existing armoured units. The Halifax Rifles troopers were reassigned to various active units and the overseas regiment was officially disbanded in November 1, 1943. As a result of this process, Trooper Burton Croft “re-mustered” as an Operator CAC (Canadian Armoured Corps) on August 4, 1943. One week later, he was assigned to the Headquarters Squadron, 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade (4th CAB).
The 4th CAB was one of two armoured brigades created with the formation of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division (4th CAD) in Canada on January 26, 1942. Under the command of Major General F. F. Worthington—affectionately known to his men as “Worthy”—the Division consisted of the 3rd and 4th Armoured Brigades. Each brigade contained three armoured regiments and a “support” motor regiment for transportation purposes.
4th CAD established its training facilities in Debert, NS. Its tanks—brand new Ram Mark II models—arrived in May 1942 but were not equipped with their standard six-pounder guns. With the exception of Worthy and one of his assistants, none of its personnel were capable of operating the tanks as their instructors were still in training at Camp Borden.
Worthy quickly developed a reputation for innovation and persistence as he set about training his novice troopers. When a train carrying fully equipped Ram Mark II tanks destined for overseas arrived in Debert on its way to Halifax, Worthy “persuaded” the trains crew to allow him to unload four of the armoured vehicles. A gunnery range was established at Spencer’s Point on the Minas Basin, where troopers honed their marksmanship skills by shooting at logs floating in the water.
An insufficient number of tanks—15 in total among six regiments—meant that the vehicles had to be shared among the two Brigades’ units. Crews were limited to one to two days of actual tank operation weekly. On the remaining days, the troopers carried out “dismounted” drill, simulating tank operation using an H-shaped wooden frame. Crews assumed their relative positions within the structure, which was then “maneuvered” on an imaginary battlefield to simulate various tank formations.
Worthy’s creative methods meant that his troopers were fully trained within five months. The bulk of 4th CAD departed for the United Kingdom in August and September 1942, arriving overseas at a more advanced level than its sister 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s units. After settling into their new quarters, 4th CAD’s personnel immediately commenced tactical training.
By the time of 4th CAD’s overseas arrival, Allied military strategists had learned important lessons from the British experience in desert warfare during the North African campaign (1941-42). The combat demonstrated the need for close co-ordination between tank and infantry formations. In response, the British high command reorganized its armoured divisions into a pattern that was subsequently duplicated by the Canadian formations.
Within each Armoured Division—4th and 5th—one armoured brigade (three tank regiments) was replaced with a motorized infantry brigade (three infantry regiments). This new arrangement was formally adopted on January 11, 1943, and resulted in significant re-adjustments within both Divisions. 4th CAD now consisted of the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade, which included three tank regiments—the 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Regiment), the 21st Canadian Armoured Regiment (Governor General’s Foot Guards), and the Canadian Grenadier Guards. A fourth armoured unit—the Southern Alberta Regiment—served as the Brigade’s reconnaissance (“recce’) group.
The 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade became 4th CAD’s second brigade and consisted of three Ontario infantry battalions—the Algonquin Regiment, the Lincoln & Wellington Regiment and the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise’s). The entire 4th CAD was assigned to II Canadian Corps, a decision that later determined its battlefield assignment.
After the re-alignment, 4th CAD’s armoured units resumed training, initially focusing on squadron field operations at the brigade level. In May 1943, personnel participated in two major Division-level exercises at South Down. In September, 4th CAD relocated to a battle training area in Norfolk. By that time, Burton had logged one month’s service with 4th CAB’s Headquarters Squadron. During the Norfolk exercises, he was attached to the 21st Canadian Armoured Regiment (Governor-General’s Foot Guards) for three weeks in October as part of his training.
In December 1943, 5th CAD departed for Italy. After landing in Naples, its units immediately joined Canadian forces deployed on the Adriatic coast north of Ortona. The Division would remain in Italy until March 1945, when its personnel relocated to Western Europe for the last two months of the war. The 5th’s Mediterranean assignment meant that 4th CAD was destined for service in Western Europe.
Burton’s training continued throughout the winter of 1943-44. On January 15, 1944, he was admitted to City General Hospital, Carlisle, for treatment of a laceration to his right middle finger. He received the injury during “range practice” at AFV Ranges, Warcop, UK. Burton described the incident in a report in his service file:
“I was in the turret of the Sherman tank as loader operator at the time of the accident. I loaded the gun, the round was fired and the gun recoiled. The empty casing ejected and struck the deflector plate[,] which caused it to come towards me and strike me on the right hand. We were under rapid fire at the time and I was holding two rounds on my knee. The force of the blow split my second finger open.”
Discharged from hospital at month’s end, Burton returned to HQ Squadron, 4th CAB.
The following month, a major change occurred in 4th CAD’s command structure. On February 29, 1944, Major General Worthington was relieved of command and assigned to Camp Borden, ON, as its Commandant. The decision was a controversial one. While Canadian officials pointed to his age—Worthy was 55 years old at the time—post-war sources indicated that it was the result of personality differences with Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, II Canadian Corps’ Commanding Officer (CO). Major-General George Kitching replaced Worthy as 4th CAD’s CO. Around the same time, Brigadier General Leslie Booth assumed command of 4th CAB.
On April 10, 1944, Burton was attached to No. 28 Canadian Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Regiment) and spent two months with the unit before rejoining HQ Squadron on June 12, 1944. By that time, 4th CAD was completing preparations to depart for the European continent. It had not been assigned to the massive Allied force that landed in Normandy, France, on June 6, 1944. The plan was for its personnel to remain in the United Kingdom until the beach-head was firmly established.
The first 4th CAD units landed in Normandy on July 14, with its remaining components making the journey across the English Channel over the following 10 days. Burton’s squadron left the UK on July 22 and landed in France two days later. Once all equipment was ashore, 4th CAD moved into reserve positions southeast of Caen before month’s end.
The 4th CAD’s arrival in France coincided with the first major Allied plan for to break out of the Normandy beach-head. Operation Totalize relied heavily on armoured units to push through a formidable German defensive line anchored on Verrières Ridge, south of Caen. The 2nd Canadian DIvision’s 2nd Armoured Brigade and 4th Infantry Brigade would carry out the first phase, in conjunction with British armoured and infantry units. Canadian forces would advance southward along the western side of the Caen - Falaise Road, with their British comrades on the eastern side.
For the first time on the battlefield, infantry units would travel in improvised armoured personnel carriers nicknamed “Kangaroos.” Hastily manufactured in the field from surplus American Priest self-propelled guns—their guns were removed— and driven by personnel from the 2nd Armoured and Divisional artillery units, the innovation was a mainstay in subsequent offensives.
The main Canadian force consisted of tanks, M-10 self-propelled ant-tank guns and infantry transported in armoured carriers. Attacking units were arranged in three columns, covering a total area approximately 150 metres wide. The advance was to begin just short of Verrières Ridge, across open ground west of the village of Rocquancourt. Once through the main section of the German line, the three columns would fan out to capture several objectives to the left and right.
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| Source: C. P. Stacey, "The Victory Campaign" |
The preliminary stage commenced at 2100 hours August 7, the armoured units moving forward under cover of darkness to a location just short of the start line. Personnel then waited for a fleet of heavy bombers to strike strategic targets in the German line. At 2330 hours, the armoured columns moved forward. As they reached the crest of the ridge 15 minutes later, searchlights provided “artificial moonlight” as a rolling artillery barrage commenced.
Problems soon developed during the columns’ advance. The dry ground stirred up by the tanks’ tracks, supplemented by explosions from the artillery barrage, created a dense dust cloud that obscured visibility for all but the lead tanks. A smoke screen laid down by artillery guns across the entire front only made the situation worse.
The result was considerable confusion in the advancing columns. Several collisions occurred, while other vehicles ran into shell craters, sunken roads, ponds or ditches. The columns strayed off course, some vehicles ending up in adjacent columns. Two of the three columns veered significantly off course, causing delays.
Despite the confusion, the advancing units encountered little German opposition as enemy forces were also hampered by the poor visibility. Before dawn, two of the three columns were close to their objectives, only the right column having fallen behind. Once at their destinations, the units re-organized in preparation for Geman counter-attacks. Overall, the first stage had unfolded pretty much as planned.
Unfortunately, the same could not be said for the second phase, which was led by the recently arrived 4th CAD. The goal was to take advantage of the first stage’s gains. Unfortunately, final orders were received in the early evening of August 7, leaving little time for orders and briefings at lower levels. The situation led to chaotic, last-minute preparations, a circumstance made worse by the units’ complete lack of combat experience.
A massive aerial bombardment that commenced at 1300 hours August 8 also failed to significantly impact German forces, who by coincidence commenced a major counter-attack as it commenced. As a result, many enemy units were inside the “bomb line” during most of the air raid and were not significantly affected.
To further complicate matters, errant Allied bombs destroyed many of 4th CAD’s communication vehicles, significantly reducing its ability to contact supporting artillery units. The Division also moved forward along a very narrow frontage, leading to confusion and a very slow pace. The forward units quickly encountered well-entrenched German positions that offered stiff resistance. By last light, the attack had lost what little momentum it managed to establish.
Hoping to regain the initiative, Allied commanders hastily assembled a smaller force consisting of the 4th CAB’s 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment (British Columbia) and three of the Algonquin Regiment’s infantry companies. The group was instructed to quickly advance and capture Point 195, an elevated feature south of Quesnay that was of considerable strategic value.
The small force commenced its advance at 0330 hours August 9. Unable to rely on landmarks to determine its location and direction, it soon strayed significantly off course to the east, ending up on the wrong side of the Caen - Falaise Road. Pausing to regain its bearings, officers spotted an elevated area in the distance and immediately assumed it was their objective.
In fact, the location was another hill—Point 140—that was six kilometers northwest of their target. The tanks and armoured personnel carriers rushed forward as daylight broke, only to encounter a main section of a German defensive line in front of the Laison River, held in force by a German Panzergrenadier battalion.
Just before 0700 hours, the attacking party mistakenly reported to Headquarters that it was atop Hill 195. A half hour later, German forces launched a counter-attack. The fighting continued throughout the day, the small force’s armoured vehicles systematically destroyed as the hours passed. Some personnel were able to escape by crawling through waist-high wheat fields. The remaining soldiers were either killed, wounded or taken prisoner.
The 28th Armoured Regiment (British Columbia) lost 47 of its 55 tanks and suffered 112 casualties, 47 of whom were fatalities. The Algonquin Regiment reported 128 casualties, 45 of whom were killed in action. A second force dispatched to Hill 195 to assist also ran into significant enemy positions in Quesnay Wood, losing 22 tanks.
Point 195 was finally secured in a daring 10th Infantry Brigade “silent raid” during the early morning hours of August 10 and held into the afternoon, At that time, the soldiers were ordered to retreat before day’s end due to lack of supporting units. The day’s only real success came with 4th CAD units captured the village of Brettevile-le-Rabet, an achievement that brought Operation Totalize’s second phase and the DIvision’s first major combat experience to an end.
In retrospect, an eight-hour delay between the two stages, during which the massive bombing raid took place, was the main reason for the second phase’s failure to exploit the first phase’s gains. The break allowed German forces time to recover and adjust their defences, particularly their anti-tank positions. It was a lesson that warranted consideration when planning future operations.
Unlike their British Columbia and Algonquin Regiment comrades, Trooper Burton Croft’s 4th CAB HQ Squadron came through its first combat experience without significant losses. There was little time to rest, however, as Allied commanders immediately commenced planning a second push along the Caen - Falaise Road, one that would be led by 4th CAD units.Given the code name “Operation Tractable,” its goal was to break through a reconstituted German line established along the Laison River, south of Rouvres.
As with Totalize, the first stage would occur during daylight hours and commence with a heavy bomber raid. Attacking units would then advance through a smoke screen laid down by artillery. To avoid heavily entrenched German defences in Quesnay Wood, which had disrupted Totalize’s second phase, planners shifted the centre of the attack several kilometers to the east.
4th CAD would begin the advance along a two-kilometre wide front, its eastern flank running from Soignelles to Rouvres, beyond which lay the Laison River. Once the attacking forces had crossed the water course, the 10th Infantry Brigade was to capture Epancy and Perrières while 4th CAB’s tanks rushed forward to capture Point 159, an area of high ground near Versainville that overlooked the town of Falaise.
Simultaneously, the 3rd Canadian Division’s 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade would advance on 4th CAD’s right flank, its final objective being Point 184, an area of high ground near Potigny. As with the previous operation, armoured brigades would lead the attack, followed by infantry units in Kangaroos. A truck-borne infantry brigade would follow the attacking forces, ready to provide support as required.
The operation was scheduled for August 14. During the previous evening, the armoured brigades assembled near Renémesnil, the weather “hot and clear” as personnel completed final preparations. At 1130 hours August 14, the lead units moved forward to their designated “forming up” locations near the start line, the village of Soignelles in its center. Approximately 280 Sherman tanks prepared to advance to the Laison River along a four-kilometre wide front.
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| Source: C. P. Stacey, "The Victory Campaign" |
The tanks were supposed to proceed toward the Laison River at a pace of 20 kilometres an hour. However, dense clouds of dust from the moving vehicles combined with the smoke screen to reduce visibility and significantly slow the pace. Once again, both 4th CAD Brigades—armour and infantry—veered to the left and the organized columns soon disintegrated into clumps. The smoke screen failed to blanket the entire line of attack, particularly in front of the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade’s tanks. As a result, German forces in front of the river inflicted a heavy toll on its attacking units.
The most significant loss in the first stage of the attack was the destruction of 4th CAB’s Headquarters Squadron—Trooper Burton Croft’s unit. As they passed through the cloud of smoke and dust, its tanks veered to the right and ran directly into a German anti-tank screen. Brigadier General Booth, 4th CAB’s CO, was severely wounded and died shortly after he was evacuated from the battlefield.
Major Gerry Chubb, the only HG officer to survive the incident, was unable to report the incident as all of HQ Squadron’s radios were destroyed. Three hours passed before Chubb finally connected with 4th CAD HQ and relayed news of the Squadron’s fate. Throughout that time, 4th CAB was “leaderless” on the battlefield.
Despite the initial problems, the advance made steady progress, the first tanks reaching the Laison River at 1430 hours. Unfortunately, the bridge they hoped to secure had been destroyed by German forces. The river proved to be a greater obstacle than anticipated. The wooded banks on the opposite shore were too steep for the tanks to climb and the river bottom consisted of soft mud. Time was lost and casualties taken as the armoured units scoured the northern bank in search of a location where they could ford the river.
It was almost 1600 hours before the first tanks crossed the Laison, using a single, improvised fascine bridge erected by Canadian engineers at Rouvres. By that time, shelling from both sides had turned the village into a pile of rubble, hindering passage through its streets. Another group of tanks managed to cross four kilometers downstream at Ernes, while a third group found a small bridge midway between Rouvres and Montpoint that was still intact. Only two squadrons were able to ford the river.
After German forces were driven off the heights overlooking the river, an hour passed before the armoured units gathered their forces and resumed the advance. 2nd CAB on the right flank moved forward around 1730 hours, but soon encountered anti-tank fire. The countryside was open and rolling, with many clusters of small woods and brush where German guns were concealed. The first 2nd CAB tanks arrived at the heights near Potigny before darkness, but Point 184 was not secured until 2230 hours.
Due to the loss of its Headquarters Squadron, 4th CAB’s advance beyond the Laison was “confused” and uncoordinated. All three armoured regiments re-formed on the heights beyond Rouvres and set out for their intermediate objectives near Glendon. As with 2nd CAB, the tanks encountered German anti-tank fire that slowed their advance.
As the area around Glendon appeared to be held in strength, it was decided shortly before 2000 hours that it was too late to push forward to the final objective near Falaise. Later that night, 4th CAD’s 10th Infantry Brigade secured Glendon with the support of a tank regiment.
The following day, the advance toward Falaise resumed but the confusion and lack of co-ordination that had plagued the previous day’s advance continued. A significant part of the problem was that two armoured groups—2nd CAB and 4th CAD—were converging on the same objective—the high ridge north of Falaise, centered on Point 159. To make matters worse, the two units exchanged little information on their locations or movements throughout the day.
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the advance was beyond the range of Allied artillery units and therefore could not call for supporting fire when required. German forces had also bolstered their anti-tank defences in front of Falaise during the night. 4th CAD moved forward at 0930 hours but immediately encountered fierce mortar, artillery and anti-tank fire. By mid-afternoon, its progress had stalled approximately three kilometres northeast of Point 159. As the high ground was open and flat, there was no cover available, forcing the tanks to pull back to avoid enemy anti-tank fire. Thus the 4th CAD’s fighting in Operation Tractable came to an end.
In the 3rd Canadian Division sector to the right, 2nd CAB reorganized in the morning and launched an early afternoon attack on Point 168, a hill two kilometres south of the previous day’s progress. The location was secured by 1530 hours, but at considerable cost. The 1st Canadian Scottish Regiment suffered 34 killed and 93 wounded during the day’s fighting.
2nd CAB then received orders to attack Point 159 with one infantry and two tank regiments. The instructions, however, were quickly retracted due to confusing and contradictory information concerning the location of other Canadian units. Thus ended 2nd CAD’s participation in Operation Tractable.
On the afternoon of August 16, 2nd Canadian Division units launched an attack on Falaise, securing the town by the following morning. By that time, American forces had halted 16 kilometers to their southeast, having completely encircled what remained of the German 5th and 7th Armies in Normandy. In the ensuing days and hours, the remaining enemy units hastily withdrew through a narrowing gap between Falaise and Argentan. If Allied forces could manage to completely close the “Falaise gap,” they would deliver a major blow to German forces in France and take a major step toward winning the war in Western Europe.
According to Commonwealth War Graves Commission records, 12 members of 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade’s Headquarters Squadron were killed on August 14, 1944. Trooper Wilfred Burton Croft was one of the 12 fatalities. Burton was initially buried in a “field SE [southeast of] La Croix” on August 16, 1944.
The exact circumstances of Burton’s death remained a mystery to his family for one year. At that time, Victor Luddington, a native of Drum Head who had married Burton’s sister Ada Jane in October 1940, and subsequently enlisted with the Royal Canadian Artillery, was serving overseas as a Gunner with the 6th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery. At an unknown date, Victor posted a notice in the “Maple Leaf,” a Canadian military newspaper distributed to soldiers serving overseas, hoping to contact a soldier from Burton’s unit who could provide information on the incident.
On August 13, 1945, Corporal J. B. Crawford, HQ Squadron, 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade, responded to Victor’s inquiry:
“One of the boys here noticed a request from you in the Maple Leaf for information about Bert Croft.
“Well, I guess I can give you just about as complete a picture of the surroundings where he was killed as anyone, as I happened to be in a tank very close to the one Bert was in that day. Bert’s tank was hit with an 88 [mm shell] and began to burn immediately. Although I didn’t actually see him get out, he and the gunner and crew-commander mage their way out of the tank to a nearby German trench work. The other two members of the crew were killed in the tank or in trying to escape. Meanwhile the three fellows from the turret made their way up this trench trying to work their way close to the other tanks so as to make use of their cover—when a hidden Jerry [German] machine gunner riddled the trench and killed all three of them.
“We were exceptionally lucky and managed to get away unharmed. I certainly felt the loss of the boys in that tank as I had just left the crew a short while previous to that and Bert and I were the best of friends. He was buried in the exact same spot they found him by our burying party the following day. Now they tell me he will probably be removed to a proper cemetery near Bretteville-le-Rabet. It was close to here that the action took place. It is about 12 miles south of Caen.”
At the end of August 1944, officials completed an Official Canadian Army Overseas Casualty Notification form, suggesting that Burton’s mother Lydia received a telegram informing her of his death around that time. An official letter to Lydia, dated September 14, 1944, and signed by the Canadian Adjutant-General, stated: “It was with deep regret that I learned of the death of your son, F/30416 Wilfred Burton Croft, who gave his life in the Service of his Country in the Western European Theatre of War, on the 14th day of August, 1944. From official information we have received, your son was killed in action against the enemy.”
On October 1, 1945, Burton’s remains were re-interred in Bretteville-sur-Laize Military Cemetery. Seven of his 4th CAB HQ Squadron comrades were buried nearby. The remains of four fallen HQ Squadron Troopers were never found. Their names are inscribed on the Bayeux Memorial, Bayeux, France, erected in memory of 1,798 soldiers killed during the Normandy campaign and who have no known graves.
Lydia Olive Croft passed away in Liscomb on June 7, 1957. 71 years old at the time of her death, Lydia was laid to rest in St. Luke’s Anglican Cemetery, Liscomb. Her husband George Henry died in Pleasant View Foster Villa, Dartmouth, on March 4, 1969, at 97 years of age and was also buried in St. Luke’s Anglican Cemetery, Liscomb.
Thanks to Beverly (Luddington) Webber, Tor Bay, for providing information on the Croft family and a picture of Trooper Burton Croft, and to Peter Luddington, Dartmouth, NS, for providing a copy of Cpl. Crawford’s letter to his father Victor, describing the circumstances of Burton’s death.
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